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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to present in a complete way the kernel of such a production. People migrate 
and this decision is sometimes permanent, but there are links with the country of origin that stand up 
to time and distances. With respect to this, the so called economic diaspora well depicts the broad 
transnationalism that has established as a consequence of the increasing amount of money migrants 
have been sending back home. The data collected and the estimates fully agree on this positive trend 
but the outlines of these peculiar private capital flows are still controversial. This is due to three 
aspects each section of this work tries to address. The first part analyses those remittances’ features 
on which the results of the econometric studies are still causing discussion: stability, cyclicality and 
sustainability. The second one deals with the reasons why people do remit, concluding that the world 
is more balanced than a clear-cut division between behavioural and economic motives. Finally, the 
third one tries to go through the relationship between remittances and development, topic on which 
lots of studies have been conducted but that is still far from a comprehensive and convincing 
conclusion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Migrants’ remittances commonly refer to 
certain transactions that are initiated by 
individuals living or working outside their 
countries of birth or origin and related to their 
migration. However, if we want to provide a 
more formal definition (World Bank 2006), 
three items under which remittances are 
encountered (OECD 2005) into the IMF 
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (IMF 
2004) need to be considered. These are 
compensations of employees, workers’ 
remittances and migrants’ transfers 
(Straubhaar 2005). The first category belongs 
to the subsection income and comprises 
wages, salaries, and other benefits earned by 
individuals in economies other than those in 
which they are residents, for work performed 
for and paid for by residents of those 
economies. The second one, belonging to the 
sub-category current transfers, covers current 
transfers by migrant (World Bank 2005) who 
are employed in new economies and are 
considered residents there. Finally, the third 
one that is accounted into the capital transfers 
arises in correspondence to the migration of 
individuals from one economy to another 
(Mannan & Kozlov 1997). It is made up of three 
components: the flow of goods (personal 
effects) accompanying the migrant, his flow of 
financial assets and the change in the stock 
positions due to the change in his residence 
status (IADB 2006). All these data, like all the 
other components contained into the balance 
of payments framework, are compiled by 
relevant statistical authorities in member 
countries such as the central bank or the 
national statistical office who then report them 
to the Statistics Department of the IMF, where 
global tables are compiled and published in 
the annual report. 
Nevertheless, the data contained in the BOPSY 
are far from being perfectly estimated so that 
any data comparison and aggregation have to 
be approached with caution (Giuliano & Ruiz-
Arranz 2006). First of all, aggregate data are 
subject to variations of compilation on a 
national basis as a consequence of a variety of 
concepts and methodologies that are not 
uniformly applied across all countries. With 
regard to this, the definition of residence is 
one of the most critical since some countries 
still consider their nationals working abroad 
for a year or longer as national residents and 
therefore their earnings as compensations of 
employees, simply because they maintain 
strong linkages with their home country. 
Secondly, data sourcing and compilation is 
better in some countries than others, leading 
up to the fact that some of them do not report 
all the items to the Fund or, at worst, they do 
not send any data at all.  
Apart from terminological issues, in most of the 
cases, data weaknesses and omissions depend 
on the difficulties in obtaining all necessary 
data (World Bank 2006). The system through 
which remittances can be transferred is, 
indeed, multidimensional. The broadest 
distinction is between formal and informal 
channels (Mannan & Wei 2009), whose 
regularity depends on the possibility that the 
flows can be systematically and formally 
collected. The former include hand deliveries 
by the migrant himself or by a courier, 
ordinary mail, informal geographical systems 
such as hawala (in Pakistan and Bangladesh), 
hundi (in India and Nepal) or mulas (in Cuba), 
and ethnic stores. Even if the way of naming 
the system of transferring money differs from 
one country to another (and among the 
systems mentioned, ‘feich’ien’ (in China), 
‘chits/chops’ (in China) have to be added too) 
the mechanism is almost the same 
everywhere: the trust (Puri & Ritzema 1999). It 
involves two intermediaries. The first 
intermediary (called the ‘hawaladar’ or the 
‘mula’) in the sending country (country A 
henceforth) receives funds in one currency 
from a person from country A to be transferred 
to another person in the recipient country 
(country B henceforth). The person in country 
A receives a code for authentication proposes. 
The hawaladar then instructs his 
correspondent in country B to pay an 
equivalent amount in local currency to the 
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designated beneficiary, who needs to disclose 
the code to receive the funds. According to the 
IMF there is a positive correlation between the 
limits of a country’s financial capacity and the 
degree of informality of its transfer system 
(IMF 2005). 
However, comparative costs of transfers (IMF 
2002) have also to be mentioned as 
contributors to a fertile environment where 
informal channels can develop. As far as the 
tradeoff between them and formal channels is 
concerned, migrants often prefer to risk more 
instead of sending their money through 
regular ways (Roberts & Morris 2003). The 
latter encompass postal services, banks, 
credit unions and money transfer companies. 
Migrants behave very differently with respect 
to them. The Mexican migrants in the United 
States, for example, are sceptical as regards 
the banking system and so prefer sending 
their money home through international wire 
transfer services (NELM 2003), such as 
Western Union (OECD 2005) or Money Gram, 
even if it is much more expensive (Leon-
Ledesma & Piracha 2004). The costs related to 
the fees or the minimum balance the 
intermediaries fix to transfer remittances, plus 
the nature of passive consumers of the Latin 
migrants with respect to technology, and the 
legal status that prevents them from using this 
kind of service (Suro et al 2002), contribute to 
this.  
On the other hand, Turkish banks, such as the 
Turkiye Is Baankasi or the TC Ziirat Bankasi, 
are the most important channels for the 
transmission of remittances from Germany to 
Turkey (OECD 2005). They are estimated to 
account for more than a half of all remittance 
transactions. This is especially due to quite low 
fees. Finally, the migrants from the MENA 
(Middle East and North Africa) countries and 
East Europe in both Italy (Mannan & Krueger 
2002) and Spain usually use postal services to 
send their money back home. From the 
Nineties the Eurogiro, which is a collaboration 
network of postal banks, has operated in direct 
cooperation with the Universal Postal Union to 
promote new solutions for postal financial 
organizations worldwide (Mannan & Kozlov 
2003). Its strength has been its new, close, and 
friendly approach to migrant customers and 
the fact to have become quite widespread all 
over Europe. It indeed operates in more than 
30 countries (including the European Union). 
After having said what remittances are and 
how they can be transferred by migrants, we 
portray their geographical distribution. In 
most cases remittances, relative to other 
macroeconomic indicators, are significantly 
higher in low and lower middle income 
countries than in the other developing 
countries (El-Sakka & Mcnabb 1999). They 
follow two main directions. The first one is that 
from developed to developing countries, in 
other words they move from the North to the 
South. While the second one is between 
developing countries, hence from South to 
South. The top receiving continent is Asia with 
its 40-46% of the annual total flows, the second 
one is the Latin America and Caribbean Area 
with their 17-22% of total flows and finally 
Central and Eastern Europe (15-18%). For 
countries instead, the first three recipients are 
India, China and Mexico in total terms and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti and Lesotho in 
relative terms (as a share of national GDP). 
Finally, as far as sending countries are 
concerned, the World Bank has estimated that 
the United States and Saudi Arabia are the 
main pools of origin (Quibria 1997). 
The scholars have spent much of their work 
discussing and testing three features related to 
remittances: stability, cyclicality and 
sustainability. They all describe remittances’ 
behaviour through time and space but from 
different points of view. 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
MIGRATION  
Stability, in the sense of low volatility (World 
Bank 2004), consists of being less affected by 
the impact of favourable and unfavourable 
shocks than other capital flows (Mannan & 
Krueger 2004). In other words, they would 
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suffer less from any sharp withdrawal or 
euphoric surge that characterize foreign direct 
investments and development aid towards 
emerging markets (Terry et al 2004). The 
rationale is behind the trend of the finance for 
development as a whole in the last twenty 
years. So if we compare their components, 
remittances have not only had a positive (or 
much more positive than ODA’s) trend but it 
has also been much more stable (World Bank 
2004) than the others’. According to the OECD, 
while FDI and capital market flows fell sharply 
from 2000 due to the recession in the high 
income countries, migrants’ remittances 
continued to grow, reaching USD 149.4 billion 
in 2002 (Lucas 2004). And for the World Bank 
they would have amounted to $ 167 billion in 
2005, up from $ 160 in 2004. In several 
recipient countries, remittances in 2004 
largely exceeded the volume of ODA, and in 
certain case even that of the FDI or of income 
from the export of good and services. But what 
is striking is not only their positive trend but 
also their steady way of reacting to 
unexpected economic events (Mannan & 
Kozlov 1995).  
This would be due to two peculiar 
characteristics that distinguish them from FDI 
and ODA. They are private and characterized 
by altruism and solidarity motives that are 
supposed to remain stable. So if we look at the 
figures provided by the International 
Organization for Migration (Ghosh 2006), we 
can see that from 1995 to 2004 remittances 
have grown from 58 to 160 US $ billion, FDI 
from 107 to 166 US $ billion, while ODA to 59 to 
79 US $. And, even from 1998 to 2001, when 
private capital flows declined in the wake of 
the Asian financial crisis, remittances to 
developing countries have continued to rise. 
Furthermore, if we consider the allocation of 
remittances, those intended for consumption 
would be less volatile than those intended for 
investment. Migrants may indeed increase 
remittances in times of economic hardship, 
especially in low income countries where their 
families may depend significantly on 
remittances as a source of income and may live 
at close subsistence levels. And even when the 
purpose behind is investment, remittances are 
less likely to suffer from those up and downs 
that characterize portfolio flows to emerging 
markets. This depends on migrants’ stronger 
propensity to invest in their home country 
despite economic adversity than foreign 
investors’ (Orozco 2004). 
In addition, even when exceptions could be 
made to remittances’ response to dramatic 
changes in economic activity in recipient 
countries, the decline of remittances and 
volatility have been smaller than those of other 
capital flows, meaning they are affected by the 
investment climate in recipient countries in the 
same manner as capital flows, though to a 
much lesser degree. In the Philippines, for 
example, remittances rose steadily as the 
investment climate improved in the early 
Nineties, becoming more volatile following the 
financial crisis in the late 1990s (Burgess & 
Haksar 2005). Similarly, Turkey’s remittance 
receipts increased for most of the 1990s but 
suffered a decline as the economy slipped into 
the crisis in 1999 and 2000. Estimates from the 
World Bank confirm such a trend after cross 
countries comparisons of workers’ 
remittances receipts relative to some key 
indicators as corruption, inequality, financial 
development (M2/GDP), openness 
(trade/GDP), domestic debt (debt/GDP) and 
country risk (institutional investor rating).  
So remittance receipts averaged 0.5% of GDP 
in countries with a higher than median level of 
corruption, compared to 1.9% in countries 
with lower than median corruption. Countries 
that were more open or more financially 
developed (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2006) also 
received larger remittances. On the other 
hand, stability is sometimes tested through the 
evidence of altruistic motives behind the 
decision to remit (Bouhga-Hagbe 2004; 2006) 
seeming reasonable that these motives 
remains firmly fixed. This can be captured in 
the following way: a negative long run 
correlation of remittances with wage in the 
home country, or a negative correlation 
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between transfers and real GDP in the home 
country, or a positive correlation between 
remittance and income in the country of 
residence. It is important to remark that 
stability can be also intended in the sense of 
resistance to the sending country’s economic 
activity. As regards to this, the nexus between 
US business cycle and workers’ remittances 
have also been studied, leading again to a 
steady reaction as far as the latter are 
concerned (Suro et al 1999). 
Since much more work needs to be done to 
compare remittances, FDI and ODA, but 
everybody seem to agree on the reliability of 
the results, it is worth mentioning what the IOM 
is worrying about stability. First of all, they 
claim that gross inflows of remittances should 
be adjusted against the recorded debts in the 
balance of payments framework, especially 
for those countries that are at the same time 
recipient and sending ones. Otherwise, 
overestimation can be a possible biased 
result. Secondly, they suggest migrants 
remittances are not considered a substitute for 
ODA, that are transactions between 
governments, hence bound to projects to be 
implemented in the recipient country. 
The starting point for defining cyclicality is a 
recent work (Kaminsky et al 2004) in which this 
property is described as the correlation 
between the cyclical components of net capital 
flows into a country and its output. The 
migration literature has then borrowed this 
definition for depicting the relationship 
between the cyclical components of 
remittances and recipient countries’ level of 
GDP growth. So, remittances are said to be 
countercyclical when the correlation between 
their cyclical components and output is 
negative (positive), in other words, the 
economy would borrow from abroad in bad 
times (remittances in/out) and would lend 
(borrow) in good times (remittances out/in). 
On the other hand, they are a cyclical when the 
above correlation is not statistically 
significant, meaning that the pattern of 
international borrowing and lending is not 
systematically related to the recipient 
country’s business cycle. The reason why the 
debate among scholars is so heated on this 
issue depends on the possibility for countries 
of using or intending to use future potential 
remittances as collateral for international loans 
in periods of economic downturn in order to 
overcome liquidity constraints. 
As for stability, the critical starting point for 
dealing with cyclicality are the assumptions 
behind the decision to remit (Mannan & Kozlov 
1999). As a matter of fact, the literature is 
divided into two streams of thought depending 
on the prevalence of consumption smoothing 
or portfolio motives. If the former is assumed, 
counter cyclicality is straightforward. 
Remittances would be compensatory in the 
sense that they would compensate for poor 
economic performance in the home country. 
On the other hand, pro-cyclicality would be 
linked to a search of investment opportunities, 
because migrants would tend to send their 
remittances when the economic situation in the 
country of origin is favourable. 
Moreover, three other variables need to be 
considered. First of all, the passage of time, 
since it may change the cyclical properties of 
remittances. Then the economic situation in 
the country of destination needs also to be 
encountered. Regarding to this, even if 
remittances move counter cyclically with the 
output in the home countries of migrant 
workers, the cycle in home and host country 
economies may move together in synchrony, 
thereby making it difficult for migrant workers 
employed in a crisis-struck economy to help 
out family members facing similar conditions 
back home (Sayan 2006). Finally, the average 
level of remittances on which the recipient 
country can count matters a lot. 
The formal way cyclicality can be tested 
consists of evaluating the country correlations 
between the cyclical components of 
remittances and GDP. First of all, the trend 
within each series need to be removed to 
identify stylized facts of business cycles and 
analyze cyclical nature of remittance receipts. 
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De-trending each series by removing the 
estimated trend makes it possible to separate 
fluctuations around the trend of each data 
series, making examination of the statistical 
properties of the co-movements of deviations 
of output and real remittances from their 
respective trend. When respective trends are 
properly filtered out from real remittances and 
output series for each country, the remaining 
cyclical components would be stationary with 
zero mean for each variable. Then, 
contemporaneous and asynchronous cross 
correlations between the cyclical components 
of respective series can be calculated to 
identify cyclical characteristics of remittances. 
Pro-cyclicality of remittances in this context 
refers to the tendency of real remittances to 
move above its trend, whenever the 
corresponding real output variable is above its 
respective trend. In the absence of such a 
tendency, remittances and output are said to 
be a cyclical. 
A step beyond cyclicality has been recently 
made in order to assess if financial 
development smoothes or amplifies the 
cyclicality of remittances (Giuliano & Ruiz-
Arranz 2006). Assuming portfolio motives 
behind the decision to remit, the authors try to 
address if more developed financial systems 
are associated with more or less pro-
cyclicality. The a priori paradoxical result 
suggests that remittances are more pro-
cyclical in countries with shallower financial 
systems, namely that migrants tend to seek 
more investment opportunities in countries 
with less developed financial sectors, while, 
on the other hand, remittances are more 
countercyclical in countries with deeper 
financial systems. If these results were going 
to be confirmed the macroeconomic 
consequences would be of great value 
(Kireyev 2006). 
Sustainability implies the relationship 
between migrants’ duration of stay in the 
destination countries and the level of 
remittances sent back home (Mannan & 
Krueger 1996). One of the oldest and 
influential article on remittances already used 
to deal with this third and last remittances’ 
feature, highlighting an inverse relationship 
between the two variables (Lucas & Stark 
1985). The rationale for the negative sign is 
related to the diminution and at worst the 
cease of the remittances transferred to the 
home country as time goes by. In particular, it 
is argued that this is a feature that would 
manifest after five year of permanence abroad. 
The subsequent literature, except for the initial 
piecewise increasing behaviour, has been 
firmly confirming the same conclusions. And 
what is more important is that any assumption 
related to the motives of remitting (either 
altruistic or self-interested) is not conditional 
(Gerard-Varet et. al 2001). So, for example, if 
pure portfolio motives are present, the migrant 
would remit since he expects to come back 
home sooner or later. But if at the end he does 
not, pure self-interested motivations would 
have no sense and remittances would start to 
decrease or cease (Mannan & Wei 2008). This 
is why an interesting analysis could be 
conducted exploring the relationship between 
the circulation of the highly skilled people and 
the intention to remit (Docquier & Marfouk 
2004).  
The result, meaning a positive relationship, 
could lead to another conclusion in favour of 
the so called ‘brain circulation’ (Desai et al. 
2001).  On the other hand, if altruistic reasons 
are present, the ties with the home country can 
become less stringent in time (Stark 2005). 
Finally, even in presence of what are called 
‘enlightened self-interested’ motives the 
negative relationship holds. What is assumed 
behind this last case is the presence of an 
‘informal contract’ between the migrant and 
the family left in the country of origin (Mannan 
& Wei 2007). So the intention of the former, for 
example, would be that of repaying the latter 
for the costs due to his human capital formation 
incurred before the departure, but once they 
have expired the level of the transfers would 
tend to weaken (Mannan & Kozlov 2001).  
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The IOM has recently argued that a crucial 
moment towards the negative relationship 
between the time spent abroad and the 
intention to remit, is the change in the legal 
status of the migrant or the acquisition of an 
open-ended labour contract, since they would 
accelerate the weakening of the bonds with 
the sending countries. As regards to this, we 
could perform the nexus between the number 
of permanent visa issued by a country of 
destination and the change in the amount of 
remittances in the respective countries of 
origin of the migrants. We should expect a 
negative coefficient if the lack of sustainability 
holds. 
Concerning the definition of sustainability but 
taking in consideration just the propensity to 
remit of the highly skilled migrants, a 
remarkable step forward as far as both the 
brain drain and the remittance literature are 
concerned has been taken in the last few years 
(Faini 2006; 2005; 2004; 2002). Given that 
skilled migrants tend to stay longer in the host 
country and are more likely to family 
reunifications, the inverse relationship 
between the time spent abroad and the 
intention to remit holds whenever the so called 
‘reunification effect’, meaning the intention of 
the migrant of living with his family in the host 
country, is stronger than the so called ‘wage 
effect’, the potential increase of the amount 
remitted due to the higher skills embedded by 
the migrant. In addition to this, we have also to 
say that the fact that the brains usually come 
from relatively wealthier families can matter 
and so needs to be controlled (Commander et 
al 2003). 
We could question whether a negative 
sustainability associated to a steady increase 
of the total amount of remittances can be 
considered a contradictory result. In our 
opinion, this is not. If we, indeed, consider the 
figures of the total migration flows in the last 
two decades, we can see that despite the 
restrictive policies adopted by recipient 
countries, numbers have continued to rise 
(Fargue 2006), strongly conditioning 
remittances’ trend more than a still vague 
remitting behaviour. 
When considering a micro approach to 
remittances, the question why migrants decide 
to give up fractions of their disposable income 
to send them back to their country of origin 
needs to be answered. We first deal with the 
most general framework that can be assumed 
considering jointly what the New Economics of 
Labour Migration (NELM), the life course’s 
argument and the articles on social networks 
have separately dealt with, and then we shift 
from it to a more specific and rigorous 
classification of the remitting decisions  
(Taylor 1999; Mannan & Krueger 1998). The 
rationale is that, behind the most common 
motives encountered by the literature on 
remittances (Rapoport & Docquier 2004), 
different kinds of human beings are present, 
and beyond them an unevenly influential 
background made up of many components. 
These can be classified in the following way: 
The level of education of the migrant, his 
language skills, his level of integration in the 
host country and the role of the social networks 
are crucial variables. Regarding the last one, 
three approaches have been proposed 
(Piotrowski 2006): social networks of migrant 
in the destination country, social networks 
spanning destination and origin communities 
created by circulation of migrants, 
household’s social networks at origin. In 
particular, as far as the third one is concerned, 
measures from sibling and rice harvest help 
networks can be used (Munshi 2003). 
Employment of the migrant (fixed or open-
ended contract), level of income in the host 
country, level of income of the household in 
the home country, needs-tested transfers 
received by the migrant in the country of 
destination (Lowell & DeLa Garza 2000)., and 
income risk belong to this economic 
component. In particular, the last variable can 
be studied either from a migrant’s (host 
economy’s risk variables) or from his 
household perspective (origin country’s 
income risk). 
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The time spent abroad by the migrant, the 
nature of the migration decision (endogenous 
or exogenous), which kind of laws concerning 
family reunion are present in the destination 
country, how is the procedure for obtaining 
the legal status there, and the state of the 
naturalization status of the migrant matter a lot 
(Devorets & Vadean 2005). It is reasonable to 
expect that there are some macroeconomic 
factors, both in the host and in the home 
country, which may significantly affect the 
migrant’s portfolio management choice, hence 
the flows of remittances (Gupta 2005). They 
can be the following ones: interest rate 
differential, the level of inflation, the financial 
spread, the black market premium, exchange 
rates, and national policies implemented as 
incentive schemes, political stability (Tunkay 
et al 2005). 
Which of these components is then significant 
or how some of them can combine together 
determine the peculiarity of each single micro-
framework (Siddiqui & Abrar 2003). The 
literature distinguishes among pure altruism, 
self-interested motives, loan repayment and 
insurance motives. Under the first case, the 
migrant derives utility from the utility of those 
left at home since he concerns about them. 
This is the most intuitive, tested and 
widespread presumption. It implies that 
remittances increase with migrant’s income 
and degree of altruism, and decrease with the 
recipient’s income and, more interestingly, 
degree of altruism. But, since the parameters 
concerning the degree of altruism cannot be 
observed, the main testable implications are 
those related to the economic and 
demographic components described above. 
First, the amount of remittances should 
increase with the migrant’s income. Secondly, 
transfers cannot increase with the recipient’s 
income. Thirdly, the sustainability of 
remittances should be inversely related to the 
presence of key members of the family in the 
country of destination. Fourth, counter 
cyclicality should hold. 
On the other hand, behind self-interested 
motives, there is a migrant that considers just 
the advantage to himself when making 
decisions, and acts for his own benefit. On this 
regard, many situations can be thought of. He 
can remit money as to buy various types of 
services such as taking care of his assets or 
relatives (children, elderly parents) at home. 
Then remittances can be driven by a ‘biased 
altruism’ (Lucas & Stark 1985), under which the 
aspiration to inherit is powerful (Hoddinott 
1994), or by the intention of acquiring or 
enhancing prestige in his country of origin’s 
local community (Massey & Basem 1992). 
Finally, remittances can also be instrumental in 
reaching a predetermined saving target or in 
investing in real estates (Merkle & 
Zimmermann 1992). From all these 
frameworks, it is evident how one of the 
presumption behind pure self-interest is the 
migrant’s intention to return to his country of 
origin, hence his strong ‘home attachment’. In 
this case, testable implications could be again 
those related to the demographic and the 
income components but also to the macro 
framework (Thieme & Wyss 2005). First, 
sustainability should hold as long as the 
migrant stays abroad but then, after his 
departure, should drop at once. Secondly, the 
amount transferred should increase with the 
level and the quality of the service to be 
offered, increase with the level of migrant’s 
income too, but should react ambiguously to 
an exogenous increase in the recipient’s 
income ((Thieme 2002). 
We can reasonably argue that remittances in 
both the inheritance and the so called 
‘exchange’ (Rapoport & Docquier 2004) 
perspectives, take place when there is a 
welfare gain for all the parties concerned. So, 
except in the case of perfect mutual altruism, 
some arrangements need to be reached 
between the senders and the receivers (Djajic 
1998; 2001). Two variables generally matter a 
lot. The first one is the role of the bargaining 
power, especially in the former framework, 
while punishment devices and social norms 
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affect the latter one. So, in the first case a 
testable implication could be the inverse 
correlation between the unemployment at 
home and the level of transfers sent home. 
Since it is assumed that the level of education 
and the employment condition give more 
bargaining power to the related party. While, 
on the other hand, in the second case, the 
amount of remittances should increase with the 
remaining household’s assets and income, the 
probability of inheriting, the migrant’s wealth 
and income, and should decrease with the his 
own degree of risk aversion. 
Since both pure altruism and pure self-interest 
alone may be inadequate or partially 
explanatory in describing the extent and the 
variability of remittances, an alternative theory 
is therefore provided, viewing remittances as 
part of an intertemporal, mutually beneficial 
contractual arrangement between migrant and 
home (Amuedo-Dorantes, & Pozo 2006). It is 
important to stress that this theory (called as 
‘tempered altruism’ or ‘enlightened interest’) 
is not merely the intersection of pure altruism 
and pure self-interest but rather offers a quite 
separate set of hypotheses.  
The first hypothesis consists of the 
endogenous nature of the remitting decision 
(Agarwal & Horowits 2002). This means that it 
is one of the consequence, if not the most 
important one, of the decision to remit. This 
originates from the household’s evaluation 
which considers a Pareto-superior strategy to 
allocate certain members of the family as 
migrants, and manages remittances as the 
mechanism for redistributing the gains. The 
second hypothesis is that arrangement 
between the migrant and the family are 
voluntary and thus must be self-enforcing. The 
third set of hypotheses is related to the 
prevalence of one of the following 
components: investment or risk (Mannan & 
Wei 2006). If the former exists, remittances can 
be seen as a loan repayment, while in the latter 
case they become part of an insurance 
contract. 
In the first case, that of a loan agreement 
model, remittances serve as repayment (once 
the investment starts to pay off) for both the 
pre-migration investments in the migrant’s 
human capital and the migration costs, under 
the assumption that the ‘parent company’ 
(Poirine 1997) has before lent to the future 
migrant to finance his education in the home 
country and his establishment in a foreign 
country, where returns on investment seem 
higher than in the country of origin (Galor & 
Stark 1990). There exist even more complicate 
loan agreement models in which remittances 
continue to be sent by the migrant even after 
the total repayment of both the education and 
migration costs incurred by his family. It is 
assumed a second stage in which migrant 
remittances are loans made by migrants to 
young relatives to finance their education, 
until they are themselves ready to migrate.  
Finally, in a third stage remittances would be 
either a sort of retirement subsidy paid by this 
new generation migrant to the old one once 
having come back in the country of origin, or 
self-interested transfers made by the old 
migrant with the intention of ensuring his own 
assets at home on his return.  Since both 
education and migration are costly we can 
imagine that just richer families can take 
advantage from such an investment 
opportunity, where the richer the family the 
higher its bargaining power. Testable 
implications of this framework can be the 
positive relation between remittances’ 
sensitivity and migrant’s income, migrant’s 
education and the distance from the family. At 
the same time, the adverse short run shocks in 
recipient economy should positively affect 
remittance transfers too, but the effect of 
recipient’s long run income is controversial. 
Finally, higher unemployment at home, 
increasing the value of education, should 
increase the level of remittances from abroad. 
In the implicit co-insurance model, two kinds 
of hypotheses are assumed. They imply either 
being insured from the migrant’s point of view 
from the income risk in the country of 
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destination and being insured from the 
household’s point of view from income risk in 
the home country. So, in the first step the 
migrant is the insuree and his household the 
insurer: the family pays for the migration costs 
and for possible initial expenses in the 
destination country. While, in the second one, 
the inverse holds: migrant remittances insure 
for unanticipated household’s income shortfall 
(Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2006).  
This kind of model is widespread especially in 
rural areas of low income countries where 
income volatility, fragmentation of the 
financial markets and poor insurance markets 
give rise to a variety of such informal contracts 
(Freund & Spatafora 2005). Foreign markets 
shocks are generally uncorrelated to those in 
the home country, so families think that 
migration could be a source of income in case 
of future agricultural drops. As far as the 
testable implications are concerned, the 
insurance and the altruistic motives share 
similar predictions with respect to the sign of 
the effects of income levels on the amount 
remitted. However, they differ with respect to 
the predicted timing of remittances, since 
remittances for insurance motives are more 
likely when income at origin is more volatile, 
meaning they should be sent on a more 
irregular basis. 
Obviously, one should not expect remittances 
to be driven by a single motive. In reality, a 
combination of different motives applies, with 
the exact mixture varying over time and 
places. This is due not only to the fact that 
different individuals may be heterogeneous in 
their motivations to remit, but also that 
different motivations to remit may coexist 
within the same individual. However what the 
evidence seems to confirm is the constant 
presence of altruistic components behind the 
migrant’s decision to send money back home. 
REMITTANCE MOTIVES 
Following the definition of economic 
development as a multidimensional approach 
that takes into consideration not only 
economic levels but also the distribution of 
income, welfare and opportunities, the 
relationship between remittances and 
development is going to be analysed in this 
section where households’ and the whole 
country’s perspective are treated separately 
(Mckinnon 1973). 
From the household point of view, a first 
important effect is the poverty alleviation 
(Adams 2002). Actually, the level of domestic 
disposable income increases since 
remittances go directly from the migrant to his 
family or friends. Evidence has showed that 
both the poverty headcount ratio, and the level 
of poverty depth (poverty gap ratio) or that of 
poverty severity can be affected (Ray 1998). Of 
course, the level of remittances matters a lot in 
enhancing such an effect. For example, it has 
been confirmed that the higher it is the steeper 
the headcount ratio’s increase. At the same 
time, the initial level of the headcount ratio 
matters a lot. The higher to start with it is, the 
stronger the effect of remittances on poverty 
(Adams 2003). These results have been 
obtained thanks to poverty simulations, even if 
one of their weaknesses is the risk of incurring 
in reverse causality problems. Cross-country 
regressions have been more efficient in 
dealing with that, showing a decrease of the 
poverty gap ratio equal to 3.5% (Adams & 
Page 2003). The same holds for household 
surveys, although the lack of proper data on 
remittances does not allow us to rely on their 
conclusions. 
Strictly linked to the issue of poverty reduction 
is that of inequality, because income growth is 
valuable for recipient households but even 
more important is the distribution of its 
benefits among different groups in society. 
Inequality is usually empirically measured by 
the Gini coefficient (Ray 1998). Household 
studies have showed opposing results in terms 
of correlation, either positive or negative, and 
dynamics, either in favour or not of a U-shape 
relationship between migration and inequality 
(Mannan & Krueger 2000). The variety of these 
conclusions depends on three important 
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factors. The first one is the initial level of 
inequality, since the higher it is, the stronger is 
the evidence in favour of a negative 
relationship.  
The second one consists of the nature and the 
level of the migration costs, where they can 
depend on the network component and/or the 
distance between the sending and the 
receiving country. It has been demonstrated 
that the higher they are the lower the 
probability that the poorest migrate and, 
consequently, remit. As far as this last issue is 
concerned, the literature (Rapoport & 
Docquier 2004).  has recently dealt with the so 
called ‘trickle down’ effect that is the effect of 
the increasing migration flows on the 
reduction of migration costs, hence a 
widespread possibility to migrate, for the 
poorest people too (Carrington et. Al 1996). If 
evidence confirmed the validity and the 
sustainability of such an effect for recipient 
countries, the results concerning inequality 
and remittances would be much more 
homogenous (even because in the last few 
years the trends concerning migration have 
been increasing almost everywhere). 
The third effect on household income depends 
on how remittances are spent. They can be 
indeed consumed, saved or invested. 
Remittances are an important source of income 
for many low and middle income households 
but how this money is used affects in a 
different, and sometimes opposite way, 
people’s welfare. As far as consumption is 
concerned, remittances can be good in terms 
of consumption smoothing, but we will see that 
on the other side, at aggregate level, an 
increase of the magnitude of consumption can 
foster inflation. And even the first effect does 
not always hold. Positive evidence exists for 
remittances that are countercyclical (Ozden & 
Schiff 2006) or pushed by insurance motives 
(Lucas & Stark 1985), but this could be the case 
of middle income families, since first of all 
poor families would not be able to send their 
individuals abroad, and secondly even if this 
were the case, their consumption pattern 
would remain the same, or would change in a 
much slower way (Lowell & DeLa Garza 2000).   
On the other hand, households can decide to 
save or invest remittance transfers. According 
to the World Bank, five factors would condition 
the prevalence of that. First of all, the 
household’s degree of dependence on 
remittances. The more households are 
dependent, the less they save. Secondly, the 
nature of the recipient, since women are more 
likely to prefer a smoother consumption path. 
Third, the existence of a conditional targeted 
destination upon the transfers. Fourth, the 
income level of the recipient family or the 
presence of credit constraints. However, 
whatever is the reason why households decide 
to invest, and taking in mind the welfare 
perspective, according to which an extra 
dollar of investment is only better than an extra 
dollar of present consumption if the marginal 
social value of investment is greater than its 
marginal private value, investments can be 
either destined to physical capital or human 
capital.  
Under the former case, investments can be 
fostered by the migrant himself or by his 
household. In regard to this, remittances can 
enhance entrepreneurship in the recipient 
country, being allocated in construction, 
housing, agricultural production and 
technology. On the other hand, the latter 
framework is fundamental especially from an 
endogenous growth perspective: relaxing 
liquidity constrains would impinge on human 
capital formation (education and health). 
Remittances may be conditional upon a loan 
agreement, or they can be inserted in a 
household’s forward looking framework.  
In the former case, the migrant, after having 
repaid for the educational expenditures 
incurred by his family, continues to send 
remittances in order to provide education to 
the new young generation. While, in the latter 
case, the recipient household decides to 
allocate its new entries in children’ education. 
From this perspective, remittances can be a 
good instrument in decreasing child labor, 
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too. But, although remittances are fungible and 
education has a relatively high income 
elasticity, so one would expect remittances to 
have a significant positive effect on the 
educational attainment of children from 
households with migrant members, a recent 
sociological argument (Hanson & Woodruff 
2002) indicates that the absence of one of the 
parents can be detrimental on children’ 
schooling achievements when credit 
constraints are the most binding (Cox & Ureta 
2003).. So, at the end, even from an 
endogenous growth perspective, the 
conclusions are unclear. 
A last but not least effect of remittances on 
households concerns labor supply. A high 
dependency degree on remittances, 
accompanied by economic uncertainty and 
asymmetric information, would lead 
households to incur in the so called moral 
hazard (Chami et al 2003; 2006) problem. 
Instead of exploiting the possible positive 
externalities related to remittances, the 
recipients would prefer to bribe the migrant 
substituting effort with leisure. This would 
have negative effects in terms of growth. 
However, a recent work (Giuliano & Ruiz-
Arranz 2006) has argued that the probability of 
the moral hazard would depend on the level of 
financial development, too. The higher it is, the 
stronger the former would be, as a 
consequence of the fact that less stringent 
liquidity constraints would discourage more 
labor supply. 
Linked to the previous arguments is the so 
called multiplier effect. Either remittances are 
consumed or invested, they can have an 
important multiplier effect (Cuc et. al 2005). 
One remittance dollar spent even for basic 
needs will stimulate retail sales, which then 
stimulates output and employment. Some 
studies have found that one dollar sent from 
migrants abroad would boost the recipient 
country’s GNP by an increase that ranges from 
1.8 to 2.553. However such multiplier effects 
would occur where output is constrained by 
insufficient demand. But in many developing 
countries where unemployment (or 
underemployment) is widespread, hiring 
costs are high, and the demand side has 
increased as a consequence of the new 
transfers, inflationary shocks are likely to 
occur, so stifling the growth effects.  
Another consequence of the low speed of 
reaction of the supply side in the recipient 
country may be a trade balance deficit. It 
consists of a disproportionate increase of 
imports in order to neutralize the increased 
internal demand. Except for the demand for 
imports towards cheap capital goods that can 
be used as substitutes for other imports and/or 
to produce exportable goods, this effect is 
detrimental for the recipient country’s growth. 
Similar to the ‘boomerang effect’ just 
mentioned, though differently motivated, is 
the so called ‘Dutch disease’. This refers to a 
steep currency appreciation that the recipient 
country sustains as a consequence of a surplus 
in the balance of payments due to the large 
inflows of remittances. As a result, once again, 
the country would suffer of an emerging lower 
export competitiveness, due to the 
deterioration of its terms of trade. However, 
neither empirical results have confirmed the 
previous effects (OECD 2005), nor 
theoretically it has been shown (Docquier & 
Rapoport 2003)  that the conditions required 
for impoverishing transfers to materialize are 
so weak exchange (Glytsos 2002). It is, indeed, 
plausible assuming that a developing country’ 
liquidity statement is overdrawn so that 
remittances can relax its deficit (Brown 1997). 
Their impact would be immediate since their 
use is not tied to a particular project with high 
import content, they bear no interest and they 
do not have to be repaid (Mannan & Kozlov 
2005). 
From a financial perspective, the following 
effects are of great value, too. First of all, credit 
worthiness can be improved by country’s 
remittances, thereby enhancing the country’s 
access to international capital markets. The 
World Bank points out that a key indebtness 
indicator, such as the ratio of debt to exports of 
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goods and services, would increase 
significantly if remittances were excluded 
from the denominator. Two studies concerning 
Lebanon and Haiti have confirmed that if 
remittance transfers were included, their 
credit ratings would increase by two notches. 
Secondly, another way for the recipient 
country of collecting international capitals is 
also through the securitization of future 
remittances.  
Using this structured financial technique, 
several banks in developing countries have 
been able to raise relatively cheap and long 
term financing from international capital 
markets. This has happened in Brazil for 
example and in Turkey, too. Other two 
important arguments have also been recently 
proposed. The first one argues that stable and 
a cyclical remittances, reducing 
macroeconomic instability, decrease the 
probability of financial crises in emerging 
markets (Bugamelli & Paterno 2005). By 
financial crises, current account reversals are 
taken into consideration, defined as dramatic 
adjustments of current account deficit that may 
be triggered by sudden stops of foreign 
capital. They, in turn, can be due to foreign 
investors’ loss in the face of worsening 
fundamentals, such as lower reserves 
(decreasing stock of international reserves 
over GDP) or higher external debt (increasing 
stock of external debt over GDP).  
The authors have found that a high level of 
remittances, as a ratio of GDP, makes the 
effects of these shocks less stringent, meaning 
a lower probability that foreign investors 
suddenly flee out of emerging markets. 
Moreover, a threshold effect of remittances 
has been provided, since the mechanisms just 
described would be much stronger when 
remittances are above 4% of GDP. If we 
consider the figures provided by the OECD in 
its last report, the last country among the top 
30 with the highest level of remittances 
received as a share of GDP is Bangladesh with 
its 6.6 % of GDP. We can reasonably define 
these two points per cent (at least) as an 
encouraging perspective as far as macro 
stability is concerned 
On the other hand, the second one is related to 
the role of pro-cyclical remittances as financial 
substitutes in countries with a lower financial 
depth (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2006). The 
authors back up that, in less developed 
financial systems, remittances can be used to 
overcome liquidity constraints, providing the 
enough collateral to borrow and/or finance 
their investments. If these results are going to 
be confirmed by future works, this would be 
very important from a theoretically 
perspective since it is as if we stated that from 
a financial development’s point of view, 
remittances can enhance dynamic 
convergence. From an endogenous point of 
view, if we consider countries with a similar 
level of initial human capital but different 
income levels, countries with a lower income 
per head should grow faster, since the further 
they are from the equilibrium the faster they 
should run to catch up.  
This is what we mean by dynamic 
convergence. And from an empirically 
perspective, too since we would be able to 
understand why remittances effects are so 
controversial, hence proceed towards 
different assumptions. Still from an indirect 
endogenous perspective, the relationship 
between remittances and brain drain has been 
considered (Beine et. al 2001). Unfortunately, 
until now, not so much work has been done 
and a few articles have shown that remittances, 
that could in principle compensate the 
recipient country for the loss of human capital, 
do not contribute to this in any way. 
 
Finally, a last detrimental macroeconomic 
implication of remittance transfers is the 
possibility that terroristic groups United 
Nations (2002) could divert these resources 
from potentially positive uses to suspicious 
purposes. This is why more and more attention 
has to be paid especially to informal transfer 
channels and why the IMF, during the Second 
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Convention on Hawala in 2004, has pressed for 
more efficient national supervisory systems. 
CONCLUSIONS 
On the occasion of the High Level Dialogue on 
International Migration and Development 
(United Nations 2002), the Secretary General 
of the United Nations Kofi Annan declared ‘We 
are only beginning to learn how to make 
migration work more consistently for 
development. Each of us holds a piece of the 
migration puzzle, but none has the whole 
picture. It is time to start putting it together’. 
We reasonably think that an important piece of 
this puzzle are migrants’ remittances. Because 
their flows to developing countries have 
steadily increased in the last twenty years, 
leaving behind both the Official Development 
Assistance and the FDI. Because they can play 
a potential key role for recipient countries’ 
economies both from a micro and macro 
perspective. And, finally, because empirical 
evidence has showed so far that their benefits 
seem to prevail over negative effects. 
In this article we have presented the kernel of 
the migration literature on remittances. We 
started from their three most debated features: 
stability, cyclicality and sustainability. We 
then moved to the motives driving remittances 
and, finally, their relationship with 
development. Both sustainability and 
cyclicality are the most controversial issues, as 
they are probably the most critical in terms of 
economic development. The former is 
fundamental from an endogenous point of 
view. In terms of dynamic convergence, if 
sustainability holds, less financial developed 
countries could redeem themselves fostering 
riskier and more productive investments, 
‘substituting’ their liquidity constraints with 
pro-cyclical remittances.  
On the other hand, from a ‘brain gain’ 
perspective, if the inverse relation between 
the time spent abroad and intention to remit is 
going to be confirmed in future works, the 
‘brain circulation could be beneficial both 
from a human capital and a remittances point 
of view (Mccormick & Wahba 1996). This 
would imply that, from a policy perspective, 
the countries of origin should become much 
more and more interested in attracting back 
home their brains from abroad, meaning 
implementing sound programs towards this 
object, such as temporary visa permits, 
research allowances, benefits bound by the 
return, bilateral agreements between the two 
countries or the universities (Mishra 2006). 
Cyclicality is much more complicated to deal 
with, since it is often strongly related to the 
motives why people remit. But once reverse 
causality has been addressed, counter 
cyclicality, a cyclicality or pro-cyclicality, may 
have distinct but equally important results in 
terms of development. Pro-cyclicality can 
boost investments overcoming liquidity 
constraints. A cyclicality can prevent the 
country from current account crises and 
counter cyclicality can provide macro 
stability. As future work, country analyses 
need to be conducted, especially because the 
change in the cyclical components of national 
GDP, the amount of remittances a country 
receives and other macro variables are 
country specific. 
Furthermore, cyclical properties may change 
through time and migrants’ remitting 
behaviour can be influenced by national 
migration policies, too. The literature is 
unevenly distributed with regard to country 
analyses. A lot of work has been, indeed, done 
on the Latin migrants living in US but, on the 
other side, the interest for the MED-MENA 
migrants who live in the European Union has 
just began. This suggests future works are 
oriented towards this geographical 
perspective. 
However, either future work or country 
policies need reliable data to deal with, and 
this is not a migration literature’s prerogative. 
If the figures are not able to describe what 
really happens, or if just one side of the coin is 
provided, the ‘whole picture of the migration 
puzzle’ will be hardly depicted. In particular, 
as far remittances are concerned, efforts have 
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to be made towards three goals: improving a 
much more formal and binding definition of 
migrants’ remittances, so that national central 
banks and statistical offices cannot have any 
doubts about that; providing banking systems 
and wire services on a migrant scale, so to 
stem informal transfers; and, finally, 
addressing estimations of the irregular flows in 
the meanwhile (Omarini 2006) price. 
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